Judge Karen Baker

For a complete access to Judge Baker’s Opinions, please visit: http://courts.state.ar.us

In Response to Trial Judge Removing Child from Custody of Mother because she gave birth out-of-wedlock:

Appellee further proposes that “[o]ne can try to lessen the impact by appealing to the better angels of our nature and pointing out that [a]ppellant had the baby and is doing the best she can. However right those choices may be, they do not vitiate the fact that [a]ppellant made a choice, and that choices have consequences.”

It appears that the choice that appellee contends constitutes a change of circumstances is the choice to continue her pregnancy and to keep the baby. We respond to this argument by stating emphatically that this court will not endorse a finding that suggests, even by implication, that failure to abort a pregnancy constitutes a change of circumstances for the purpose of custody modification.

Blair v. Blair, 95 Ark. App. 242, 235 S.W.3d 916 (2006).

In Response to Trial Judge Terminating Parental Rights for Issues Related to Poverty:

The facts of this case are disturbing, but the fact that it is not an isolated case makes reversal even more imperative. Trial judges have a duty to insist upon strict compliance with the statutory criteria before entering an order terminating parental rights. This “[i]nsistence upon strict compliance with the statutory criteria … enhances the child’s best interests by promoting autonomous families and by reducing the dangers of arbitrary and biased decisions amounting to state intrusion disguised under the rubric of the child’s best interests.” In re Danuael D., 51 Conn. App. 829, 724 A.2d 546, 553 (1999) (citations omitted). Therefore, our adherence to strict compliance with our statutes is not merely a standard of review. See Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Cox, 349 Ark. 205, 82 S.W.3d 806 (2002) (finding DHS’s conduct deeply disturbing when agency took custody of child utterly without authority and outside the limited circumstances set out in our state statutes). As one law journal notes, statistical data on neglect and children living in poverty show that “[s]tate governments appear to be destroying family ties of a large number of poor families with no concomitant benefit to children.” Second Chances: Insuring That Poor Families Remain Intact by Minimizing Socioeconomic Ramifications of Poverty, 102 W. Va. L. Rev. 607, 613 (Spring 2000).

In this State, we require strict compliance with our statutes before destroying those family ties. That was not done here, and this case should be reversed.

Johnson v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Services, 78 Ark. App. 112, 82 S.W.3d 183 (2002) (Baker, J., dissenting).

In Response to the Public Service Commission’s Failure to Properly Include Citizen Participation in Evaluating a Utility’s Request with Rate Increase Implications

The APSC is statutorily required to structure a comprehensive evaluation based upon service needs and the most economical and environmentally safe means to meet the needs of the people served. The participation of the people served is essential to that process. The determination of how the power will be transmitted to its users is a critical factor in determining whether the proposed facility can meet the utility needs of the people it serves.

Hempstead County Hunting Club, Inc. v. Arkansas Public Service Comm’n, 2009 Ark. App. 511.

In Response to a Trial Judge Making the Defender of a Woman Pay Her Attacker

Under the majority’s new standard, Arkansas becomes the only jurisdiction in the United States where a man defending a woman from her husband is liable for damages sustained by the husband when he is prevented from completing his attack upon the woman. It is unacceptable, and until today, it was not the law.

Tygart v. Kohler,  82 Ark. App. 380, 109 S.W.3d 147 (2003) (Baker, J. dissenting)(majority held that trial judge’s comments indicating that, because defender was involved with victim’s ex-wife, he should expect problems and that a reasonable man in defender’s situation should expect that he and the woman would be hunted might have been ill-advised, but however inappropriate some of judge’s comments were, they did not dictate or result in a misapplication of the law regarding self-defense).

In Response to Refusal to Require Insurer to Supply Cancellation Notice to Used Car Seller

As the majority writes this concept into law, a lienholder must prove that it is in the business of loaning money separate and apart from any other business before it can be legally entitled to the same protection that a lienholder who is in the business of loaning money is afforded. The question that then arises is who might loan people money to buy cars. Banks loan money to people with good credit and work histories. Sometimes though, people do not qualify for bank loans. Sometimes people are considered too high a risk for a bank to loan money to them.

We have a higher percentage of people in this State below the poverty level than the national average. In this largely rural state, people need cars to get to jobs, buy groceries, take their children to schools, and go to the doctor. Car insurance is not an unnecessary luxury. We require people to maintain and prove insurance coverage for licensing and traffic use. The majority’s opinion reinforces the belief that our laws afford no protection to those who loan money to the economically disadvantaged and, in fact, specifically excludes them from the protection afforded other secured parties.

John Gibson Auto Sales, Inc. v. Direct Ins. Co., 97 Ark. App. 192, 203-04, 245 S.W.3d 700, 708 – 09 (2006)(Baker, J., dissenting).